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Informal thought about the nature of mental oper-
ations important to creative human behavior suggests 
that perceptual processes are of considerable impor-
tance. The ability to “see relationships among ele-
ments” is an attribution commonly made toward au-
thors of major scientific discoveries or of noteworthy 
artistic achievements. For example, Shepard (1978, 
1981) documented self-reports from several creative 
scientists and authors that strongly emphasize the 
role of visual imagery and the manipulation of visual 
codes in the creative process.
Given the anecdotal and self-report evidence for a 
relationship between creative behavior and aspects of 
perceptual processing, it initially may seem surprising 
that there is a notable void in either research or theoret-
ical articles specifically focused on these issues. In pre-
paring this chapter, for example, we noted that, during 
the last six volumes of the Journal of Creative Behav-
ior, there was only one title that included the word per-
ception, and that paper (Goodman & Marquart, 1978) 
was limited to a one-page abstract. In addition, we 
noted that among seven current textbooks in percep-
tion that presently reside on our bookshelves, none 
contain the term creativity in their indexes, nor is the 
term creative ability addressed at any point in the texts. 
Although references to the term perception occasionally 
can be found in indexes of monographs specifically 
dealing with the topic of creativity, most of these refer-
ences refer to research related to specific theories about 
individual differences in perceptual styles or process-
ing modes, as opposed to broader contemporary is-
sues of perceptual processing. Clearly, most research-
ers in the field of perception have not touched upon 
the topic of creativity, and relatively few researchers 
in creativity have chosen to integrate their work with 
perceptual issues.
Why Have Perceptual Psychologists Had Little to 
Say about Creativity?
One reason that may have inhibited psychologists 
who were studying aspects of perception from be-
coming involved in research on creativity is the fact 
that the term itself is not viewed as a scientifically 
“tight”‘ concept of the variety preferred by relatively 
“operationalistic” behavioral scientists. As has been 
noted in earlier research (e.g., Stein, 1956; Taylor, 
1960), as well as the contributors to this volume, pro-
viding an easily agreed upon operational definition 
of creativity that can be related to specific aspects of 
observable behavior or specific information-process-
ing operations is problematic. Although there is gen-
eral agreement among researchers in human thinking 
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that a key component of creativity is the process of 
generating novel mental representations, assessment 
of creativity by society is generally done on the basis 
of product; that is, does a particular solution, inven-
tion, discovery, or artistic contribution meet the joint 
criteria of novelty and worthwhileness? Obviously, 
a wide variety of mental operations and processes 
could contribute to the characteristics of a product 
that elicit those subjective evaluations.
The lack of existing literature explicitly relating is-
sues in perception to the study of human creativity 
may also be attributable, in part, to fundamental dif-
ferences in the “level of approach” among behavioral 
scientists who study fundamental characteristics of 
mental and behavioral processes common across in-
dividuals, as opposed to those having primary in-
terest in differences among individuals. Both histor-
ically and at present, the majority of research efforts 
directed at understanding perceptual processes has 
been directed at theories, models, and descriptions 
of behavior that apply to perception in general, as 
opposed to individuals. The very term creativity, on 
the other hand, denotes an attribute that individuals 
presumably possess (or at least exhibit) in different 
amounts, hence, its study generally assumes an indi-
vidual differences approach.
In our view, however, neither the fuzziness attrib-
uted to the definition of creativity nor its degree of 
association with ideographic rather than nomothetic 
approaches is as responsible for the lack of an exist-
ing body of literature relating creativity and percep-
tion as is the fact that perception traditionally has 
been studied as a process of organizing information 
within the nervous system, whereas studies of mental 
processes associated with creative behavior usually 
imply the generation of novel representations of in-
formation within the nervous system. At first inspec-
tion, these two classes of mental activity seem to have 
little to do with each other—or worse yet, they may 
even be viewed as incompatible operations.
Is Perceptual Organization Incompatible with 
Creative Thought?
Although individual theories of perception may 
differ substantially in their emphasis upon the im-
portance of stimulus structure versus mental orga-
nizational processes (see, e.g., Hochberg, 1981, for a 
review), most theories approach perception as an in-
formation reduction process whereby noisy, variable, 
and impoverished patterns of environmental energy 
become resolved into stable and consistent inter-
nal representations optimal for human performance. 
Terms such as perceptual organization and perceptual 
constancy reflect emphasis on the information reduc-
tion processes. The latter term, in particular, empha-
sizes the role of perception in providing an individ-
ual with similar or identical mental representations of 
events that may have widely varying physical repre-
sentations in the environment.
If a major function of “efficient” perceptual pro-
cessing is to provide perceptual constancy, as well as 
to encourage different observers to obtain similar or 
identical representations from common environmen-
tal stimuli, then it does indeed seem that this organi-
zational aspect of perception works against the gen-
eration of novel representations. One might therefore 
predict that some measures of perceptual performance 
that tap perceptual organizational processes would be 
negatively related to measures of creative ability. A 
potential consequence of such a relationship would be 
a positive association between perceptual deficiencies 
or handicaps and creative ability. Case study instances 
supportive of a relationship between perceptual hand-
icaps and creative behavior can, in fact, be found in 
discussions of artistic and musical achievement. For 
instance, some of the innovative stylistic changes in 
Beethoven’s later works are commonly attributed to 
the increasing severity of his hearing impairment.
However, there are many reasons to believe that 
some aspects of perceptual performance should be 
positively correlated with creative ability—or at least 
with the output of creative products. Many prod-
ucts of creative activity are not simple spontaneous 
generations, but result from effortful production, in-
terspersed with the evaluation of feedback. Thus, 
handicapping the senses at a peripheral level (e.g., 
blindness or deafness) would certainly disrupt the 
ability to evaluate visual and auditory productions 
as they are being created. Despite what has been said 
about Beethoven’s deafness, it seems absurd to pre-
dict that there would be a general negative relation-
ship between basic measures of auditory sensitiv-
ity and frequency discrimination ability and creative 
output of music among composers, or a negative rela-
tionship between visual acuity measures and creative 
output of painters.
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The Importance of Executively Controlled 
Processing
In our view, however, there are other aspects of per-
ception for which performance measures ought to re-
late positively to creativity—in particular, processes 
under the conscious control of the perceiver. These in-
clude the ability to control various aspects of selective 
attention, to control figural organization when ambig-
uous sensory data are presented, to perform manip-
ulations of internal visual and/or auditory represen-
tations of perceptual information, and the ability to 
equate perceptual experiences obtained from different 
sense modalities (cross-modal abilities). Although the 
earlier stages of perceptual processing leading to per-
ceptual organization (e.g., sensory transduction, fea-
ture extraction, figural synthesis) typically are viewed 
as involuntary processes not under executive control, 
it is clear that perceptual organization and pattern rec-
ognition are influenced jointly by both involuntary or 
automatic and executively controlled processing.
At the level of perceptual organization, consider 
the examples of the Necker cube and of the reversible 
or ambiguous figures commonly found in most intro-
ductory psychology textbooks as well as in textbooks 
on perception (some examples are given in Figure 1). 
In each of these examples, there are contextual cues 
that cause a particular organization of the object to be 
perceived upon initial inspection. In most versions of 
these objects, observers have an ability to reverse the 
organization through voluntary changes in visual at-
tention, although the time and effort required for such 
reversals, as well as which of the possible organiza-
tions is most likely to be initially seen, can be greatly 
influenced by modifying the contextual cues sup-
porting either of the organizations. With some mod-
ifications, reversal becomes virtually impossible, and 
thus only one interpretation is obtained. Executively 
controlled processes can, within limits, significantly 
modify figural synthesis and organization, allowing a 
single physical stimulus to have multiple perceptual 
representations. Such processes may thus play a role 
in the generation of novel mental representations of 
information, which, in turn, could form the basis for 
creative products. Indeed, it is this kind of processing 
that appears to contribute to high-performance levels 
on tests, such as Guilford’s (1967) divergent produc-
tion test, that are specifically aimed at measuring in-
dividual differences related to creativity. 
Thus, we see two distinct categories of perceptual 
processes for which individual variation among dif-
ferent observers might well relate to creativity. The 
first category contains the largely involuntary pro-
cesses of perceptual organization. These are informa-
tion-reducing processes that promote stability and 
organization of percepts, and thus normally tend to 
act against the formation of novel representations of 
information. The second category of perceptual pro-
cesses, those under executive control of the observer, 
serve to modify and control the actions of the invol-
untary processes and also may serve to encourage the 
generation of novel representations of information. 
Extensive data exist on how each of these classes of 
processes affects performance as a function of stimu-
lus and task parameters. Unfortunately, the data base 
on individual differences among either of these cate-
gories of processes is limited. Thus, it is difficult to re-
Figure 1. The Necker Cube—a familiar example of how con-
trolled visual attention can change perceptual organization. In 
Example A, where the cube is essentially “transparent,” two 
distinct organizations of depth can be obtained with moder-
ate ease. In Example B, the shading and obscuring of the in-
ternal contours provide additional context making one orga-
nization dominant, although the second organization can still 
be obtained with effort. In Example C, shading of other parts 
of the figure makes the opposite depth organization domi-
nant. In Example D, where the internal contours are totally re-
moved, the alternative depth organization cannot be obtained 
at all (by typical subjects), even with considerable mental ef-
fort. Note also that, after viewing cube C, it is easier to view 
cube A (and even cube B) in the same organization as is domi-
nant for cube C.
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late directly specific empirical findings from existing 
perceptual studies to either the prediction of creative 
behavior in individuals or to modification of the en-
vironment to encourage creativity. We feel this indi-
cates a need for additional basic research in individ-
ual differences per se, as well as research that directly 
relates these individual differences to creative ability.
A Configural Conception of Creativity
The particular topics (and perceptual tasks) that 
we will be discussing are selected largely because 
they focus on the joint role of involuntarily and ex-
ecutively controlled processes in perception. We are 
guided by a broad conception of creativity that as-
sumes that there are essentially three factors that 
influence an individual’s creative potential. One 
involves the relative “looseness” of involuntary orga-
nizational processes. An individual for whom the in-
voluntary processes operate somewhat less determin-
istically (but perhaps less efficiently) is more likely 
to represent environmental data mentally (as well as 
data recalled from memory) in novel ways. The po-
tential relationship between schizophrenia and cre-
ativity (Keefe & Magaro, 1980; Prentky, 1979) would 
seem to illustrate this factor.
The second factor involves the power of execu-
tively controlled processes, such as spatial selective 
attention, manipulation of mental images, and con-
trolled cross-modal representation. Presumably, an 
individual having superior executive control of these 
processes is able to produce novel representations of 
information through effortful construction and mod-
ification of mental representations. This concept of 
“creativity through controlled mental effort” is very 
different from the concept of creativity attributable 
to “loose organizational processes.” For example, 
schizophrenics and individuals with schizotypic pat-
terns of cognitive activity are notably weak on per-
formance measures that presumably tap executively 
controlled mental processes.
The third factor, we feel, is of importance, particu-
larly to creative thought that involves sudden insight, 
that involves processes not under executive control 
nor driven by sensory data, but that produces seem-
ingly spontaneous mental representations, often in-
volving visual imagery. Based largely upon self-re-
ports of creative scientists and authors, Shepard 
(1978,1981) attributed this aspect of creative activity 
to the same perceptual mechanisms that are normally 
coupled to the analysis of sensory input, and that are 
responsible for many aspects of perceptual organiza-
tion. According to Shepard, these highly evolved and 
specialized perceptual mechanisms have the ability to 
operate upon data other than that obtained from nor-
mal sensory input, when decoupled from the sensory 
environment, as in such altered consciousness states 
as dreams. It is conceivable that the ability to use such 
spontaneously generated mental constructions in cre-
ative thought could be relatively independent of an 
individual’s power of executively controlled mental 
operations, but positively correlated with the strength 
of perceptual organizational processes.
This three-factor view of creativity, directly based 
upon perceptual mechanisms, suggests therefore, a 
highly configural, nonlinear relationship between cre-
ative ability in the population and specific individual 
differences in mental processes. By looking—from an 
individual differences perspective—at various per-
ceptual tasks that seem likely to tap differentially in-
voluntary organizational processes and executively 
controlled processes, researchers may be in a better 
position to form a more detailed model relating spe-
cific representational and transformational processes 
to creative behavior. Additionally, such research 
might guide development of programs or products 
for the enhancement of creative ability.
Impairment of Sensory Processes
One of the most highly noticeable individual dif-
ference variables in perception is that of impairment 
of one or more of the primary senses—at least insofar 
as distinguishing normal individuals (including pros-
thetically correctable persons) from those who have 
apparent handicaps. Case study analyses of creative 
output from visually or auditorily handicapped indi-
viduals is a topic that deserves intensive study on its 
own; our limited mention of the topic here is merely 
to recognize that the broad categories of differences 
in perceptual and cognitive processes that character-
ize adaptation to severe defects in either hearing or 
vision obviously can affect the creative process, albeit 
in complex ways. It is a well- known principle of de-
velopmental psychobiology that prolonged depriva-
tion of sensory experience, from birth or early in life, 
can result in permanent changes in neural structures 
that often prevent full recovery of function, even if 
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the handicap is later repaired. Furthermore, neural 
structures may adapt functions qualitatively differ-
ent from those assumed by corresponding structures 
in sensorily intact individuals. In human behavior, 
the consequences of sensory handicaps may affect as-
pects of memory and cognition that depend upon the 
use and manipulation of auditory or visual “codes,” 
in addition to the ability to gain information from 
the environment. Recognition of this fact has led re-
searchers and educators to develop specialized edu-
cational programs for hearing-impaired individuals 
that are specifically adapted to differences in modes 
of information processing among such individuals. 
In addition to producing performance differences per 
se, differences in memory codes, attention, and other 
control processes attributable to early sensory handi-
caps obviously have the potential for producing prod-
ucts that are novel when compared with norms of the 
general population of nonhandicapped individuals.
We see two major problems, however, in extrap-
olating general conclusions about creativity from 
the study of the perceptually handicapped. The first 
problem is the extreme degree of heterogeneity in 
types and degree of impairment among such indi-
viduals; not to mention potential differences in com-
pensatory processes among individuals who share 
relatively similar physical impairments and develop-
mental histories. The second problem is that the ease 
of retrieving examples of perceptually handicapped 
creative individuals from memory makes the topic 
ripe for attributions of correlations between the hand-
icap and the creativity that may not be warranted 
(e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). One may be able 
to learn a great deal about the creative processes of 
a given handicapped individual through careful case 
study, protocol analyses, and other techniques, and 
such research potentially could be of tremendous 
value to the development of special therapeutic and 
educational approaches. As a simple individual dif-
ference variable to be applied for understanding the 
characteristics of creativity in the general population, 
the handicapped-nonhandicapped dichotomy does 
not, on the other hand, appear to be very useful.
Environmental Constraints on Sensory Input
It may be more useful to consider the effects, within 
unimpaired individuals, of different levels of sensory 
stimulation upon creative thought processes. In partic-
ular, the fact that common resources are used in exec-
utive control of mental representations and in the pro-
cessing of corresponding forms of sensory data implies 
that perception within a particular modality may inter-
fere with thought processes sharing a common form 
of representation. For instance, the generation and 
the manipulation of visual images are inhibited when 
a task requires processing visual input, and manipu-
lations of linguistic representations may be inhibited 
by tasks requiring the processing of speech. The in-
terference between perceptually generated and inter-
nally generated codes that share a common modality 
easily can be demonstrated by using a task developed 
by Brooks (1968). In this task, subjects are required to 
imagine a moving dot traveling around a mental im-
age of a block drawn letter, such as a capital F (see Fig-
ure 2), and to respond orally yes or no based upon 
whether each comer constitutes an external angle (re-
quiring a “right turn” on the part of the dot) or an in-
ternal angle (requiring a “left turn”). Time to complete 
the circuit with the oral response mode is generally 
much less than that required for the same task when 
subjects must check off Ys versus Ns in a visually pre-
sented answer sheet. However, when subjects are pre-
sented with a linguistic search task, requiring them 
to indicate whether successive words in memorized 
sentences are nouns versus other parts of speech, the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. An illustration of the sort of “imaginary stimuli” 
used by Brooks (1968) to study the effect of verbal or visu-
ally guided response processes on the ability to search visu-
ally coded information in active memory. Subjects were re-
quired to mentally construct an image of a letter, such as this 
capital F, and to indicate whether each comer passed by the 
imaginary asterisk consisted of an external or an internal an-
gle. Subjects could perform better on this task if an oral yes-no 
response was used than if a visually guided manual response 
system was employed, indicating that manipulation of visual 
codes shares resources with visual perception.
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visually guided check-response mode produces con-
siderably faster searches than does the oral yes–no 
mode. Modality specific interference between imag-
ery and perceptual detection tasks also has been dem-
onstrated by Segall and Fusella (1970), who asked 
subjects to construct mental images, such as the ap-
pearance of a tree (visual) or the ringing of a telephone 
(auditory), and showed selective deficits in the ability 
to detect weak auditory or visual signals. 
Because documented self-reports of mental events 
associated with creative thought often include ex-
tensive use of mental imagery (Shepard, 1978, 1981), 
it seems plausible that creating an environment that 
minimizes potentially interfering sensory input might 
be useful in facilitating manipulations of mental image 
processing and, hence, contribute to creative thought. 
Additional research in how regulation of stimuli (vi-
sual and linguistic feedback from a display screen on a 
word processor) can affect the speed and quality of cre-
ative output is one area of applied perceptual research 
that has current value for product development. An 
increasing number of products are being released into 
the personal and professional software markets that are 
designed to aid the initial stages of manuscript plan-
ning and organization. These so-called idea processors 
are aimed specifically at the facilitation of creative out-
put for a variety of applications (Kellogg, 1986). With 
the increasing use of small computers in a variety of 
settings, one might expect the developments of similar 
products to continue. One attribute of at least some of 
the existing hardware is that users are prevented from 
viewing previously entered text—a design feature that 
seems to assume that the availability of visual feed-
back, or at least the existence of printed text that stim-
ulates the visual system of the user, is detrimental to 
performance.
As Kellogg (1986) pointed out, evaluative research 
on these products and on prototypes for future re-
lated software aids is woefully lacking. The same 
can be said for research that is not tied to a specific 
product but that provides general information about 
the production as a function of the presence of per-
ceptual stimuli of, for example, text, figural design, 
and metaphorical or analogical relationships. Based 
upon the implications of such studies as those of 
Brooks (1968), it may be the case that the presence of 
auditory or visual stimuli, while an individual is at-
tempting to “be creative,” can have certain interfer-
ing stimulus-related costs for mental representation 
and transformation, and, hence, inhibit creative per-
formance. The knowledge base that is generated from 
such a research effort might prove very useful in the 
development of both text-related products and pic-
ture-related software aids used in computer-assisted 
design. More generally, however, such knowledge 
might prove useful in the development of techniques 
for fostering increased output of creative activity in a 
much wider range of settings, through the teaching of 
specific strategies for minimizing perceptual interfer-
ence with image-based mental operations and other 
forms of mental code transformations.
Altered and Transitional States— Decoupling 
Perceptual Mechanisms from Sensory Input
Our discussion above has concerned the overlap 
in resources between mechanisms normally tied to 
the involuntary processes of analyzing and organiz-
ing sensory stimulation and those of executively con-
trolled construction and manipulation of visual and 
auditory images. A related issue concerns the po-
tential role of the perceptual mechanisms normally 
driven by sensory input during unaltered states of 
observer consciousness, when those mechanisms are 
decoupled from sensory input. Dream states, and 
perhaps some drug-induced states, represent exam-
ples of such a decoupling. Shepard (1978, 1981) ar-
gued that transitions from such states represent a fer-
tile ground for the development of creative ideas, 
because the perceptual mechanisms automatically 
linked to organizing the sensory world (which are 
normally transparent to our conscious experience) 
run “on their own,” occasionally constructing novel 
and useful percepts and images from fragments of in-
ternal neural noise and loosely guided consultations 
with memory. According to Shepard (1981), contact 
with the linguistic system allows the abstract images 
and relationships to be translated into communicable 
form. Shepard clearly viewed the mechanisms of per-
ceptual organization that involve spatial relationships 
in particular as a powerful source of general knowl-
edge about relationships that can be analogically ap-
plied to invention and problem solving:
The creative productions of a brain presumably stem 
from whatever intuitive wisdom, whatever deep orga-
nizing principles have been built into that brain as a re-
sult of the immense evolutionary journey that has is-
sued in the formation of that brain. If the arguments 
sketched out in this chapter have any merit, the most 
basic and powerful innate intuitions and principles un-
Cr e a t i v i t y a n d Pe r C e P t i o n   153
derlying verbal and nonverbal thought, alike, may well 
be those governing the relations, projections, symme-
tries, and transformations of objects in space. (Shepard, 
1981, p. 339)
Thus, Shepard described a very direct relationship 
between perceptual processes and creative thought, 
making the claim that (1) implicit knowledge of vi-
sual relationships among objects, and rules for trans-
forming those relationships, may constitute the fun-
damental mental operations inherent in much of 
creative thought, and (2) that decoupling certain nor-
mally involuntary processes from their data source 
may allow those same mechanisms to operate as a 
primary generator of creative thought. It seems ap-
parent from Shepard’s descriptions of self-report data 
that this form of creative thought is not of the con-
trolled variety (as discussed in the previous section) 
but is the product of involuntary mental operations 
that lead to spontaneous insight. Thus, the effects of 
decoupling of normal sensory input during alterna-
tive states of consciousness should be viewed as dis-
tinct from restricting sensory input in a normal-wak-
ing-state individual in order to prevent interference 
with controlled manipulation of perceptual codes.
In popular religious and scientific circles, vast 
amounts have been written about alternative states 
of consciousness that involve such decoupling of sen-
sory input, although, in our view, it is sometimes dif-
ficult to determine into which of those circles a given 
piece of research/literature should be categorized. It is 
also apparent that, throughout much of the history of 
civilization, some human beings knowingly have ex-
ploited alternative states (including dreams) as a de-
liberate strategy for fostering creative behavior—not to 
mention the use of alternative consciousness states as 
a causal construct for particular creative acts. Like re-
search relating either handicaps or psychopathology to 
creativity, selection biases and the availability heuris-
tic can play havoc with attempting to relate existing lit-
erature on alternate states and creativity either to indi-
vidual differences in creative potential or to research 
into conditions that foster creativity.
It may, however, be profitable to study the extent 
to which individual differences in dream recall might 
relate to instances of insightful creative thought, as 
well as to individual differences in attention and per-
ceptual organization. Such data could provide for a 
better empirical grasp on the degree to which infor-
mation processing in dream or transitional states ac-
tually constitutes a major source of creative pro-
ductions. Mental constructions occurring during an 
altered or transitional state can be useful only insofar 
as they are remembered, and insofar as they can be 
evaluated for application and worthwhileness. It may 
be that the degree to which decoupled automatic per-
ceptual processes contribute to creative output has far 
more to do with facility in higher level cognitive pro-
cesses, such as memory storage, retrieval, search, and 
comparison, than in individual differences in percep-
tual organization processes per se.
Consideration of the role of stimulus-decoupled 
perceptual organization processes as a fundamen-
tal source of creative thought, as Shepard proposed, 
leads to an interesting conjecture about the link be-
tween efficiency of perceptual organization and 
creativity—particularly with respect to how gen-
eral cognitive defects, such as those associated with 
schizophrenia, might relate to creative thought. One 
common view of why individuals who possess some 
of the traits of schizophrenic thought might be viewed 
as creative is that deficiencies in the normal involun-
tary perceptual organization processes lead to an in-
creased likelihood of an atypical representation of a 
perceptual event (see, e.g., Keefe & Magaro, 1980). In 
other words, it is the anomalous organization of sen-
sory input, coupled with sufficiently good higher or-
der processes to evaluate the potential worthwhile-
ness of a mental construction (or, alternatively, the 
opportunity for a peer to notice the worthwhileness 
of a product even if the cognitively impaired individ-
ual cannot perform the evaluation), that lead to cre-
ative output. However, creativity that is attributable 
to looseness in perceptual organization in the pres-
ence of stimuli is very different from creativity that is 
attributable to perceptual organization processes de-
coupled from normal sensory inputs. An increased 
frequency of transitions from hypnopompic or hal-
lucinatory states (as might be reasonably expected to 
occur in association with certain psychotic disorders), 
combined with unimpaired (or even superior) mech-
anisms of perceptual organization, thus represents 
a potential alternative route for contributing to cre-
ative thought by some individuals who possess dis-
positions toward cognitive disorders. Moreover, the 
relative weakness or looseness in organizational pro-
cesses and the ability to exploit involuntary organi-
zational processes decoupled from sensory input are 
suggested as distinct individual difference variables, 
both of which might relate to creativity in the general 
population.
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Assessing Individual Variation in Perceptual Or-
ganization Ability
Our discussion thus far suggests that obtaining a 
better understanding of patterns of individual varia-
tion in perceptual organization tendencies might be 
highly useful in examining the role of perceptual orga-
nization processes in creative thought. Unfortunately, 
with the exception of various measures of embedded 
figures performance, Gestalt grouping processes and 
other related “automatic” processes of perceptual orga-
nization have not been subjected to systematic individ-
ual difference measurements. Performance measures 
on tasks, such as those involving embedded figures, 
often do not provide a convenient way of separating 
performance attributable to loose perceptual organi-
zation (failure to group), from performance attribut-
able to strong, executively controlled focused attention 
(ability to break apart). It appears to us, however, that 
one should be able to separate the contributions of au-
tomatic organization and efficient focused attention, 
by selecting a combination of structurally similar tasks, 
including some in which perceptual organization is 
helpful to performance, and others for which percep-
tual organization is harmful.
As an example of such an approach, consider the 
example of the stimulus displays shown in Figure 
3, used by Pomerantz, Sager, and Stover (1977). The 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
task required of the subject was to detect the “odd-
ball” quadrant as rapidly as possible, and choice reac-
tion time (RT) was the dependent variable. In Example 
A, the baseline task involves choosing the oddly ori-
ented single parenthesis, located in this example in the 
upper left. This display requires a quite effortful scru-
tiny as the mean RT obtained by Pomerantz et al. was 
2,400 msec. However, adding the four extra context el-
ements in the display leads to a perceptual grouping 
phenomenon that makes the oddball element stand 
out, reducing the RT by nearly a second (for a group 
average obtained with college student subjects). Now, 
consider the display shown in Example B. Here, differ-
ent context elements are added (rotated parentheses) 
for which the result of organizational processes pro-
duces objects perceptually less distinct than the single 
parentheses, resulting in an average increase in RT of 
550 msec. Thus, in these examples, we have two highly 
similar tasks, one for which Gestalt organization helps, 
one for which it hurts.
Presumably, individuals with weak organizational 
processes would fail to gain as much benefit from the 
helpful context, in comparison with more typical sub-
jects, while performing tasks such as that of Exam-
ple A. On the other hand, such subjects also might be 
less susceptible to interference from context stimuli 
that disrupt performance of typical subjects. In con-
trast, subjects possessing nominal automatic group-
ing processes, but exceptionally powerful executively 
controlled focal attentional processes, might exhibit far 
less interference from the harmful context, while still 
maintaining benefits from the helpful context.
A related set of classification or sorting tasks that 
have the potential for separately assessing looseness of 
involuntary perceptual organization and the strength 
of voluntary visual attention is the one used by Pomer-
antz and Schwaitzberg (1975). In this experiment, there 
were three different basic sorting tasks required of a 
subject, and the stimulus response mappings for each 
of these is shown in Figure 4. In Condition A (the con-
trol condition), subjects sorted stimuli on the basis of 
orientation of the leftmost parenthesis; the orientation 
of the right parenthesis was held constant. In Condi-
tion B, which required subjects to divide attention and 
attempt to ignore the irrelevant rightmost parenthe-
sis, the response assignment was determined by the 
left parenthesis, and the right parenthesis varied in a 
manner orthogonal to the left parenthesis. In this con-
dition, classification times were considerably slower 
Figure 3. Examples of stimuli used in an “oddball quad-
rant” detection task employed by Pomerantz, Sager, and Sto-
ver (1977). In Example A, the addition of the context elements 
causes Gestalt grouping processes that make the unique quad-
rant more distinctive, whereas in Example B, the rotated con-
text elements obscure the distinction (see text for details). 
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than those of the control condition, provided the spa-
tial separation between the parenthesis pairs was close. 
As the spatial separation between the elements was in-
creased beyond a single typespace in other stimulus 
sequences, the interference from the irrelevant right 
parenthesis diminished.
Condition C required that subjects split the four 
possible pairings of parentheses into two groups, such 
that the response assignment was determined by the 
combination of both parentheses. Unlike either Condi-
tion A or Condition B, this task required an evaluation 
of both the leftmost and the rightmost parentheses. At 
close separations, such grouping seemed to occur in-
voluntarily, as subjects reported perceiving the paren-
thesis pairs as single objects. In this case, classification 
times were actually shorter than for Condition B, be-
cause the objects assigned to each category appear to 
share common perceptual attributes (e.g., “the fat ones 
vs. the skinny ones”). However, at wider separations, 
in which involuntary grouping processes break down, 
subjects had to apply effortful divided attention pro-
cesses, either to try to perceptually group the parenthe-
sis pairs or to separately evaluate each parenthesis and 
apply a classification rule. A typical pattern of results 
for these three tasks is shown in Figure 5, in which 
sorting time is plotted as a function of separation of 
the parentheses. Again, these data are based upon the 
means of subjects’ performances that were obtained by 
Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975).
One might expect, however, that individual dif-
ferences in the potency of involuntary organizational 
processes and individual differences in the execu-
tively controlled ability to break up perceptual con-
figurations (as well as divide attention, in this case) 
would produce systematic differences in the func-
tions from those shown in Figure 5. An appropriate 
application of psychometric scaling procedures to dif-
ferences among such patterns, in addition to similar 
analyses of patterns in such tasks as the “oddball de-
tection” examples in Figure 3, could lead to separate 
scales for strength of perceptual organization tenden-
cies and power of voluntary selective attention.
To our knowledge, there is no existing research 
on patterns of individual differences in the costs and 
benefits of the configural effects that might be ob-
tained by systematic administration of these or sim-
ilar tasks to large numbers of individuals, in order 
to obtain an index of relative organizational power 
among different individuals that might be of use for 
determining its relationship to creative behavior. 
However, given that individual differences in more 
traditional measures of embedded figures tasks exist 
(even though the voluntary selective component has 
not been factored out), and given the recent evidence 
of the very unique and actually superior performance 
of schizophrenics (compared with normals) on tasks 
for which avoidance of grouping contributes to per-
formance (Place & Gilmore, 1980; Wells & Leventhal, 
1984), we believe that such individual differences ex-
ist, are potentially measurable, and probably do bear 
a relationship with other important cognitive attri-
butes including creativity. Given that the presumed 
organizational looseness of schizophrenics is often re-
lated to creative thought in individuals who perhaps 
have a lesser degree of the deficiency (e.g., Keefe & 
Magaro, 1980), the data on the psychiatric popula-
tions are of considerable interest and are encouraging 
for clarifying the “creativity-madness” association 
that has been around for centuries.
Figure 4. Examples of stimuli used by Pomerantz and Schwait-
zberg (1975) in a task illustrating how Gestalt grouping affects 
selective and divided attention in a visual classification task 
(see text for details).
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Individual Variation in Intramodal Visual Code 
Transformation
In contrast to our lack of knowledge about individ-
ual variation in perceptual organizing ability, psycho-
metric tests that directly tap the ability of individuals 
to compare transformed visual objects (e.g., rotated 
block drawings, folded and unfolded block figures) 
have been available for decades (e.g., see Guilford, 
1967). Individual variation in abilities to perform 
such operations is clearly measurable, and it is ap-
parent that performance on such psychometric tests 
correlates with performance of mental tasks or prob-
lems that appear to be mediated by use of visual ana-
log codes.
One specific example is a study by Paivio (1978), 
who measured subjects’ reaction times for determin-
ing which of two clock times (given as digital expres-
sions) would produce the smallest angle between 
the hands of a standard analog clock. Paivio found 
that, in general, reaction time was a monotonic func-
tion of differences in the analog hand angles, provid-
ing strong evidence that the task was mediated by 
image comparison. In addition, however, subjects 
were divided into “high-imagery” and ‘ ‘low-imag-
ery’? groups, on the basis of a median split of perfor-
mance on a composite of Guilford’s Block Visualiza-
tion Test, the Minnesota Paper Form Board, and the 
Thurstone Space Relations Test. High-imagery sub-
jects produced RTs that averaged about 1 second 
faster at each level of angular difference than low-im-
agery subjects. In contrast, a similar split of the sub-
ject population on the basis of a verbal fluency mea-
sure (Paivio, 1971) produced no differences between 
groups. This study as well as numerous others (e.g., 
see Paivio, 1971, 1978 for a review) provide relatively 
convincing evidence that individual differences in 
ability to perform top-down manipulation and trans-
formation of visuospatial codes can be predicted ef-
fectively with existing psychometric instruments.
Figure 5. A graphical representation of results obtained by Pomerantz and Schwaitzberg (1975) for Tasks A, B, and C of Figure 4. 
Sorting times for decks of 32 cards displaying these stimuli are plotted as a function of the physical separation between the pairs 
of parentheses. Stimulus sets involving wide spatial separations between the two stimuli greatly slowed sorting in the divided at-
tention task (Task C of Figure 4), while allowing subjects to avoid interference from perceptual grouping in Task B. Presumably 
the form of such functions might differ for subjects differing in the potency of their involuntary perceptual organization processes 
as well as the power of their controlled visual attention. Reprinted by permission of LEA Associates.
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Given the apparent importance of fluent visual 
coding in anecdotal reports of creative cognition, 
it seems intuitive that psychometric measures of 
such visual abilities should relate positively to mea-
sures of creative behavior, particularly for those in-
dividuals whose creative work is arrived at primar-
ily through the effortful, voluntary route. One must 
keep in mind, however, that simple possession of a 
mental ability does not necessarily imply that ability 
will be used to produce novel and worthwhile prod-
ucts. Creative behavior requires an evaluative com-
ponent for recognizing when a particular novel rep-
resentation is of value. Given these considerations, 
and our configural view of the creative process, one 
should not expect extremely high linear correlations 
between measures of visual coding fluency and cre-
ative behavior per se.
One issue of importance in determining how spe-
cific information-processing characteristics relate to 
creativity is whether it is appropriate to view indi-
vidual differences in performance of specific classes 
of perceptual tasks as measures of relatively nar-
rowly defined information-processing abilities, or 
whether correlations among specific task perfor-
mances suggest the existence of a general ability 
“factor.” Guilford (1981, 1983) argued that processes, 
such as visual code manipulation and cross-modal 
transformations (which we will discuss presently), 
are all part of a general “transformational ability” 
that is a key component of creative thought. Indeed, 
one can make a rather strong psychometric argu-
ment for that position, as Guilford has done. On the 
other hand, perceptual psychologists who are aware 
that different neural structures may be involved in 
intramodal versus cross-modal transformations, 
and also that common neural structures may be in-
volved in both voluntary and involuntary process-
ing of visually coded information, are more likely to 
have interest in specific comparisons among tasks. 
One research question that bears upon the relation-
ship between specific visual information-process-
ing abilities and our configural model of creativity 
is whether fluency in controlled visual transforma-
tions might be related to the frequency of spontane-
ous insight in creative thought. We have thus far im-
plied, as has Shepard (1978, 1981), that spontaneous 
novel constructions are basically the result of invol-
untary representational processes, decoupled from 
their normal sensory source of data. However, it 
must be noted that most of the anecdotal reports of 
such spontaneous insight, summarized by Shepard 
and others, have come from individuals who were 
likely to score very high on measures of mental abil-
ities and who were (or still are) known to have put in 
large amounts of controlled mental effort on prob-
lems related to their creative achievements. The se-
lection, refinement, and use of images spontaneously 
generated during transitional or altered states likely 
may depend upon effortful executive processes, 
suggesting that spontaneous insight should not be 
viewed as a totally involuntary occurrence. More-
over, mental activity that substitutes for the sen-
sory signals that normally drive mechanisms of 
perception, insofar as they are influenced by mem-
ory activities, may be highly structured by previous 
effortful mental code manipulations. In short, spon-
taneous insight may not be so spontaneous and is 
conceivably quite closely related to mental transfor-
mation abilities of both intramodal and intermodal 
varieties.
An Example of the Interplay of Involuntary 
and Executively Driven Creative Processes: 
Synesthesia and Cross-Modal Representations
Previously, we have posited that these two very 
different processes might produce similar creative 
products. In this section, we will look at two related 
processes, one perceptual (automatic) and one cogni-
tively mediated (executively controlled), that do in-
deed seem to lead to similar and potentially creative 
representations of the environment.
Theorists and artists long have recognized the cor-
respondences, interrelationships, and interdepen-
dencies of the senses as they are used to capture in-
formation about the world. Aristotle and other early 
thinkers posited various relationships of cross-modal 
process or product, and Bishop Berkeley added his 
notion of their ontogeny. More recently, Stevens (e.g., 
1959), Gibson (1966), and Marks (e.g., 1978, 1982) have 
provided more refined theories and hypotheses about 
the nature, workings, and meanings of these corre-
spondences. Particularly for Marks, the evidence of 
artistic awareness and of creative use of these corre-
spondences adds weight to various laboratory stud-
ies that are in support of the theoretical ideas of cross- 
modal equivalences and sensory unity.
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Most people are familiar with the use of onomato-
poetic words, such as “hiss,” “crack,” and “woff,” to 
convey the auditory characteristics of a sound as well 
as its semantic meaning. But the sounds of words 
also seem to convey other information. Kohler (1947) 
showed that most people matched the pseudowords 
“maluma” and “takete” with the rounder and the 
more angular of two line figures, respectively. As a 
demonstration, Marks (1978) replicated the finding 
using a production task in which two children were 
asked to draw the visual representations of these 
words. The drawing of takete was clearly the more 
angular for each person. As another example of how 
word sounds can supply nonauditory information, 
Sapir (1929) and later Newman (1933) asked subjects 
about the size of objects referred to by nonsense syl-
lables and found the words containing the letter /a/ 
were judged to refer to larger objects than did those 
containing /i/. Finally, most people in our society are 
familiar with the relationships between colors and 
temperatures—red is “hot” whereas blue is “cool.”
These types of correspondences are quite different 
from the wholly involuntary phenomena of true syn-
esthesia, in which “a small minority of people experi-
ence a curious sensory blending, where stimulation of 
a single sense arouses a melange of sensory images” 
(Marks, 1978, p. 83). In addition to truly synesthetic 
individuals, there are widespread reports of involun-
tary synesthesia produced by various consciousness-
altering drugs, such as LSD and hashish.
As interesting and well-documented as true in-
voluntary synesthesia is, it is not, in itself, a creative 
product, just as the novel representations of schizo-
phrenic thought are not. Creative products require 
the additional processes of appropriate selection and 
presentation of those novel representations. Unlike the 
schizophrenics’ art, which is often identified as cre-
ative after production, the synesthetics must choose 
whether or not to capture their mental representa-
tions and present their novel version of the world.
Furthermore, although loose perceptual organi-
zation is potential source of novel representations for 
synesthetics (as for schizophrenics), documentation 
of creative products from true synesthetics is notably 
lacking. In part, the lack of documented examples sim-
ply may reflect the relative infrequency of true synes-
thetic individuals in the population, relative to schizo-
typic or schizophrenic individuals. But from each of 
these sources of anomalous percepts, numerous prod-
ucts have arisen. According to Marks (1978), synesthe-
sia has enjoyed two periods of extensive study, the first 
40 years of the twentieth century, and an earlier period 
during the nineteenth century. It was during this ear-
lier period, when synesthesia was of interest not only 
to scientists and physicians but also to musicians, that 
creative products were introduced that clearly sprang 
from the perceptual phenomena. Perhaps the best 
known of these were the multimodal concerts that 
mixed music with colored lights and occasionally with 
odor. Louis-Bertrand Castel built the first light organ in 
1735. This organ and others like it produced a particu-
lar colored light along with each note as the keys were 
depressed. Numerous pieces were written for and per-
formed with these instruments. Laser light shows are 
a more recent version of this same artistic use of the 
close relationship between color and tonality to pro-
duce desired affective responses.
Also, during the nineteenth century and later, 
there were numerous linguistic expressions of syn-
esthesia-like experiences, or synesthetic metaphors. 
The following examples of such poetry are taken 
from Marks (1978): Charles Baudelaire’s “Correspon-
dences,” “perfumes fresh as children’s flesh, sweet 
as oboes, green as prairies,” and Arthur Rimbaud’s 
“Sonnet of the Vowels” “A black, E white, I red, U 
green, O blue.” Examples of synesthetic metaphor in 
literature are (from Marks, 1982): “the sound of com-
ing darkness” (Poe); “a soft yet glowing light, liked 
lulled music” (Shelley); and “music suddenly opened 
like a luminous book” (Conrad Aiken).
On interesting point concerning these uses of 
color-sound correspondence and poetic metaphor 
(which is an important difference between these pro-
ductions and those of schizophrenics) is that none of 
these authors appear to have been truly synesthetic 
themselves (although one may conjecture about those 
authors who had a history of narcotic use, e.g., Poe). 
Yet they were able to produce creative results using 
these correspondences in ways so compelling that we 
not only understand and agree with their meanings, 
but often do not even immediately notice that there 
are “crossed” or “mixed” modality-specific adjectives 
and nuances. Marks provided experimental evidence 
that most persons have (or can develop) a strongly in-
ternalized correspondence of cross-modal relation-
ship between certain visual and auditory characteris-
tics (primarily brightness and loudness). Thus, we see 
that an automatic perceptual process—the capabil-
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ity and tendency toward cross-modal associations—
is necessary for the appreciation of creative products 
generated by an executively controlled process.
In this discussion, we have tried to give an exam-
ple of how knowledge of an infrequent, perceptual, 
and automatic phenomenon (synesthesia) can pro-
vide the impetus for the use of executively controlled 
processes to create artistic products. Finally, the ap-
preciation of these creative products greatly depends 
upon the ability to “perceptually resonate” with those 
products, an ability that seems to be nearly universal 
and automatic.
Summary and Conclusions
We have argued that the generation of creative be-
havior can result from a combination of involuntary 
and executively controlled processes. These processes 
rely heavily on neural mechanisms and systems that 
have evolved primarily as perceptual systems. How-
ever, these systems, which embody highly sophisti-
cated computational and inferential mechanisms, also 
serve to operate on mental codes actively retrieved 
from memory (e.g., conscious generation and modifi-
cation of imagery). In addition, there is anecdotal ev-
idence that these same mechanisms can be the source 
of spontaneously generated images or representations, 
when their normal driving source of sensory stimula-
tion is decoupled, as in transitions from dreams or al-
tered states. Such spontaneous generation, if appropri-
ately selected and recognized as useful, perhaps can 
produce the sudden creative insights characterized by 
many self-reports from creative individuals.
According to our analysis, creativity thus can re-
sult from some combination of (1) novel percepts at-
tributable to departures from the normal determinis-
tic processes of perceptual organization, (2) effortful 
conscious mental activity involving manipulation and 
transformation of codes that generate novel represen-
tations, and (3) spontaneous generation of novel rep-
resentations. Because the relative contributions of each 
of these to a specific creative achievement presumably 
varies markedly across both situations and individu-
als, the relationship between specific cognitive abilities 
or characteristics of processing and the likelihood of an 
individual’s producing products judged to be creative 
is highly configural and thus difficult to measure. The 
configurality of factors is particularly problematic in 
that individual differences in cognitive processing that 
affect these three 4 “routes” to creative thought proba-
bly are not independent. For example, the looseness in 
perceptual organization that may characterize creative 
individuals with schizotypal thought patterns may 
well be negatively correlated with ability to make ef-
fortful mental transformations as well as the ability to 
recognize that a novel mental representation is worth-
while. We do believe, however, that research efforts 
into individual differences in specific perceptual char-
acteristics potentially can be useful in both increasing 
our understanding of their relationships to creative be-
havior, as well as for determining circumstances that 
might foster creative thought. As we have noted, re-
search literature describing individual differences in 
perceptual organization tendencies is notably lack-
ing. The study of individual differences in executively 
controlled transformations of mental representations 
has received considerably more research effort, due 
to a long existing presumption that such operations 
are closely related to measures of basic mental abili-
ties. However, the “mental measurement” motivation 
for much of this research, has, in our view, directed re-
searchers more toward the study of “common trans-
formational ability factors” (e.g., Guilford, 1981, 1983) 
rather than toward the properties of specific types of 
mental code manipulations, such as synesthetic meta-
phor. Lastly, the literature on spontaneous generation 
of novel representations by perceptual mechanisms is, 
at present, highly speculative, and consists primarily 
of self-report anecdotes.
A Flow Diagram of the Creative Process and Its 
Implications
To summarize our view of how processes related 
to perception influence the creative process, we of-
fer the flow diagram shown in Figure 6. In addition, 
Table 1 summarizes some of our conjectures about 
the relationships between various components of the 
flow diagram and some individual difference vari-
ables potentially measurable by existing or design-
able assessment instruments and surveys.
Essentially, Figure 6 is a visual summary of our 
previous discussions of a configural view of the cre-
ative process. It lists as sources of novel representa-
tions (1) atypical involuntary processes of percep-
tion, including both loose organizational processes 
160 Fl o w e r s & Ga r b i n i n Ha n d b o o k o f Cr e a t i v i t y  (1989) 
and true synesthesia, (2) spontaneous (and involun-
tary) generation of insight and imagery, (3) conscious 
perceptual organization, (4) conscious intermodal 
transformations of representations, and (5) conscious 
cross-modal transformations of representations. In 
addition, it includes the process of selection of novel 
representation and feedback to the executively con-
trolled processes for purposes of refining the poten-
tial creative product.
In Table 1, we have chosen to relate the uses of each 
of the potential sources of novel representations dis-
cussed in this chapter together with an “efficiency” ‘ 
selection mechanism drawn from the following set of 
individual differences variables: (1) strength of per-
ceptual organization, SPO; (2) imagery ability, IM; 
(3) general measures of transformation ability, T; (4) 
schizotypal thought, ST; (5) drug usage, DU; (6) abil-
ity to report dreams, DR; and (6) amount of reported 
conscious effort expended on the problem for which 
a creative solution is found, EF. Note that these items 
constitute a nonexhaustive sample of potentially mea-
surable individual differences variables. As we have 
mentioned previously, respected psychometric in-
struments exist that presumably tap some of these, 
whereas for others, instruments would need to be de-
veloped. Furthermore, measurement of some of the 
self-report variables (such as DR and EF) would most 
likely involve both validity and reliability problems 
Figure 6. A schematic representation of our view of how involuntary and executively controlled perceptual processes contribute 
to creative thought (see text for details).
Table 1. Hypothetical Associations between Modes of Generating and Selecting Creative Representations and Vari-
ous Measures of Individual Differences (see text for a detailed explanation).
Source SPO IM T ST DU DR EF
Loose perceptual organization – – – + +? ? –?
Synesthesia ? +? ? –? + ? ?
Spontaneous imagery +? + + –? ? + +
Conscious perceptual organization + + + – –? ? +
Intramodal transformation + + + – – ? +
Cross–modal transformation ? +? ? – ? ? +?
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that we will not address here. Given those disclaim-
ers, and with the additional disclaimer that nearly all 
the cell entries are based upon our own current per-
sonal speculations as opposed to existing data, we of-
fer this table of hypotheses as a guide for potential fu-
ture research. The cell entries themselves consist of + 
and — signs to indicate presumed positive and nega-
tive correlations, together with ? signs that specify ei-
ther that no particular relationship is likely to exist, 
or, if there is one, we have no basis to speculate its di-
rectionality. Additionally, we have used the question 
mark as a modifier to indicate above average uncer-
tainty about our speculations.
We should call attention to one pattern among these 
hypothetical intercorrelations that emphasizes our pre-
vious statements about the configural nature of cre-
ativity. That pattern is that individuals whose creativ-
ity stems largely from anomalous perceptual inputs 
(i.e., individuals with loose perceptual organization 
and perhaps a rare, creative, true synesthetic) are likely 
to be very different from creative individuals who rely 
more heavily upon executively controlled processes. 
Conceivably, this might bear upon differences in the 
types of creative products that are developed by indi-
viduals who rely predominantly upon anomalous per-
cepts for novel representations, as opposed to those 
arising from some combination of executively con-
trolled manipulations of representations and sponta-
neous imagery and/or insight. As a possible case in 
point, one often encounters examples of schizophrenic 
paintings and drawings, yet rarely does one encounter 
mention of schizophrenic poetry or sculpture.
As a final point, we do not wish to imply, by our 
apparent emphasis upon individual difference vari-
ables in this final section of this chapter, that research 
on conditions that affect the likelihood of creative be-
havior within a given individual is less important 
than research aimed at predicting patterns of creativ-
ity among individuals. Clearly, the two classes of re-
search complement each other; by learning more 
about relationships between perception-related pro-
cesses as varieties of creative behavior, we may dis-
cover strategies for optimizing creative production 
within individuals. Similarly, through applied re-
search aimed at development of “thinking aids,” “de-
signing aids,” and “writing aids,” or through the 
evaluation of such products, we may discover addi-
tional relationships among perceptual and cognitive 
processes and the creative process. 
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